井冈山卫士 发表于 2023-6-4 22:23
Ukrainian forces greatly needed to stabilize the front, and establish a stable blocking position, an ...
Despite Prigozhin’s assertion that the Russian regulars abandoned their posts and left the Russian wings undefended, we later learned that these forces - including mobilized motor rifle units - doggedly defended their positions and only withdrew under orders from above.
Which army was really destroyed in this “strategically insignificant” city? Which army was being profligately wasteful of its manpower? And most importantly - why did this middling city become the site of the largest battle of the century?
Battle of Bakhmut was fought from August 1, 2022 to May 20, 2023 - a total of 293 days.
井冈山卫士 发表于 2023-6-4 22:32
In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic. The AFU did bring a hefty grouping of units to play ...
In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic
井冈山卫士 发表于 2023-6-4 22:32
In fact, what happened was rather anticlimactic. The AFU did bring a hefty grouping of units to play ...
This is an absolutely enormous commitment (37 brigades, 2 regiments, and 18 separate battalions (plus irregular formations like the Georgian Legion) which indicates obviously severe losses
Ukraine had an extremely high burn rate which forced it to commit nearly a third of its total ORBAT
this burn included a large number of Ukraine’s premier and veteran forces, including fully a dozen assault, airborne, and armored brigades.
The number that I have been working with is approximately 17,000 total Wagner KIA in the Bakhmut operation (with a min-max range of 14,000 and 20,000, respectively).
The enormous inventory of AFU units that were churned through Bakhmut included something on the order of 160,000 total personnel. Taking loss rates of between 25 and 30% (roughly on par with Wagner’s burn rate), it’s clear that Ukraine’s losses were extreme. I believe total irretrievable losses for Ukraine in Bakhmut were approximately 45,000, with some +/- 7,000 margin of error.
Russia churned through its single most disposable military asset, leaving its regular ORBAT not only completely intact, but actually larger than it was last year.
Meanwhile, Ukraine was left with virtually no indigenous offensive power - the only way it can conduct offensive operations is with a mechanized package built from scratch by NATO
Bakhmut was after all a very good place to fight a static defense. If the AFU could not hold it, or even produce a favorable loss exchange, can a strategy of holding static fortified belts really be deemed viable?
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